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2.2 Wage spillovers between the public  
and corporate sectors
Álmos Telegdy
The aim of this section is to analyse the effect of public sector wages on corpo-
rate compensation. This indirect effect of the State’s activity on labor markets 
has largely been neglected from research on wage spillovers over recent dec-
ades although the interaction of public and corporate wages is an important 
ingredient to wage setting policies.1 If public and corporate workers compete 
on the same labor market, corporate employees may consider the public sec-
tor as an alternative to their current employment. If total compensation, in-
cluding the net value of amenities and disamenities derived from various job 
attributes, is high in the public sector, private employers may face difficulties 
in the hiring process or have to cope with large quit rates among incumbent 
employees. To prevent such mechanisms taking place, they have to increase 
wages to keep a high-quality workforce and to prevent their current employ-
ees moving to the public sector.
May spillovers between public and corporate wages exist, their estimation 
is not straightforward, to say the least. Public and corporate labor markets 
are distinctly different in all countries. Public sector employees work fewer 
hours, enjoy longer paid vacations, have more secure jobs and the required 
effort, worker motivation and job satisfaction may also differ across the two 
sectors (Delfgaauw and Dur, 2008; Heywood et al., 2002). Workers therefore 
self-select themselves into one or the other sector based not only on observ-
able, but also on unobservable characteristics such as their innate ability, risk 
aversion, willingness to work hard in exchange for higher wages and faster 
promotions and so on (Roy, 1951). Another problem contaminating the meas-
urement of wage differentials of private and public sector employees is that 
public sector workers typically cluster in a few industries – predominantly 
in state administration, health care and education – where the share of cor-
porations is small or non-existent. This makes it impossible to control for in-
dustry wage effects, which may be sizable (Krueger and Summers, 1988). Any 
of the factors discussed above may create co-movements of the wage levels in 
the two sectors; to identify a causal relationship, an exogenous variation of 
public sector wages is necessary.
The Hungarian institutional context is particularly useful in analysing pub-
lic wage spillovers as it provides the exogenous variation of public wages which 
permits overcoming many of the identification problems discussed above and 
the interaction of public and corporate wages can be measured more accu-
rately than is usually possible. The Hungarian government executed a large 
wage increase in 2001 and 2002 and thus created the conditions to establish 
1 A thorough search of the lit-
erature resulted in only a few 
papers analysing public wage 
spillovers: for example, Jacobsen 
(1992) studies this question in 
the United States and Lacroix 
and Dussault (1984) in Canada.
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the effect of public wages on corporate compensation. The large and rapid in-
crease of public sector wages provides a unique opportunity to identify wage 
spillovers as the exogenous wage increase breaks co-movements between pub-
lic and private sector wages. The sector-specific differences discussed above, 
which may bias the estimation, do not present a problem here as it is unlikely 
that the composition of workers, job attributes or industrial wage differen-
tials changed considerably in such a short period of time.2
Data description
The dataset used in this study is the Hungarian Wage Tariff Survey Data, 
hosted by the National Employment Office. It provides yearly information on 
workers’ year of birth, gender, highest level of education, occupation, earnings, 
tenure and type of contract (corporate and two types of public sector labor 
relation, as discussed below). These data are recorded for May of a given year. 
I use the years between 1998 and 2006 in this chapter as the public wage in-
crease took place in the middle of this period.
I keep in the sample only full time employees between 18 and 60 years. The 
police, military, firemen and border guards are not included in the public sec-
tor data, and I excluded the legal professions as their employment relation is 
regulated by a special law and they were not subject to the wage increase. The 
final sample includes 379–487 thousand public sector employees and 106–153 
thousand corporate workers. The comparison of the sample and the popula-
tion data reveals that the sample of corporate and public sector employees is 
about 7–8 and 70 per cent, respectively.
Composition of employment and the evolution of wages in the 
public and corporate sectors
Composition of the public and corporate employment. Public and corporate 
employment differs in a wide variety of dimensions. The public sector is pre-
sent in health care, education and public administration while the share of 
corporations in these economic sectors is minuscule. As presented in Table 
2.2.1, the demographic attributes of employees are very different in the two 
sectors. Three-quarters of public sector workers are female which is almost 
twice as large a share as in corporations. Corporate employees’ potential la-
bor market experience is shorter by two years.3
Given the peculiar industrial structure of the public sector, it is not sur-
prising that the occupational structure of employees is very divergent across 
the two sectors. Professionals and associate professionals are the most typi-
cal occupations in the public sector and 60 per cent of all employees belong 
to these categories. This is in sharp contrast with such occupations’ share of 
20 per cent in corporations. As expected, skilled workers are the most typi-
cal workers in the corporate sector as 46 per cent of all occupations are in 
2 Employers may raise wages 
even if actual mobility does not 
take place between the two sec-
tors due to threat effects. See 
Borjas et al. (1997) on threat 
effects in the context of inter-
national trade and Farber (2005) 
on wage effects resulting from 
the threat of unionization.
3 Potential experience is com-
puted as age – years of educa-
tion – 6.
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this category while such occupations’ share is only 6 per cent in the public 
sphere. Managers are more prevalent in the corporate sector: their share is 
9.5 per cent, 1.5 percentage points higher than this occupation in the public 
sector. Elementary occupations have a share of 14 per cent in the public sec-
tor, almost twice as high as in corporations.
Table 2.2.1: Composition of the workforce in the public and private sectors
Public Corporate
Gender (Female) 73.5 39.8
Labor market experience
23.8 22.0
(10.6) (10.1)
Occupation
Manager 8.0 9.5
Professional 30.6 4.9
Technician, associate professional 28.4 14.9
Clerk 6.4 6.7
Service 6.7 10.3
Skilled agricultural, craft industrial 6.0 45.7
Elementary 13.9 8.1
N 3,969,046 1,185,909
Notes: Pooled data. All variables are dummy variables, except average experience (in 
years, standard deviation in parentheses).
Public sector wage policies. The period between 1997 and 2006 is character-
ized by a steady growth of the Hungarian economy. Gross domestic product 
(GDP) grew each year between 3 and 5 per cent (Hungarian Statistical Of-
fice), and private wages followed this pattern, as we document below. Public 
sector wages, however, presented a more volatile behaviour which was prob-
ably rooted partly in the need to increase these relative to corporate wages 
and partly through political considerations.
Wages in the public sector are determined by a wage grid, which consists 
of a base wage and multipliers. Compensation may change either by raising 
the base wage (in this case the relative wages in the public sector are not af-
fected) or the multipliers can be changed (which implies that relative wages 
within the public sector will vary).
During the period studied the multipliers concerning public servants’ wages 
did not change so their relative wages were also stable, but the base wage was 
raised considerably. Most importantly, a large and universal wage increase 
raised each public servant’s base wage (but it did not affect civil servants). 
While the base was increased steadily between 1998 and 2002 such that rel-
ative wages between the public and corporate sectors were stable, in 2002 it 
was suddenly increased by 50 per cent. The following year it did not change 
but in 2005 it was raised again by 14 per cent. This was, however, accompa-
nied by a decrease in multipliers which further reduced the wage differentials 
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within the public sector. The last year in these data was election year and the 
base wage was raised again by 10 per cent.
Civil servants’ wages were increased in 2001 (15 per cent of the sample are 
made up of these employees, who are typically highly skilled and work in 
public administration). Wage policy in their case was used to motivate civil 
servants to work in the public sector for their whole career. The base wage 
was almost constant, but the multipliers were changed such that it increased 
the relative wages of university graduates and those with long experience.
It is important to note that the wage grid serves only to set the minimum 
compensation for various categories of workers (defined by the level of edu-
cation and experience). Total compensation may be larger due to allowances 
(such as a managerial allowance) and public sector organizations also have the 
right to pay higher wages if they have the funds for it. Public sector employees 
also received a 13th month’s salary during the period studied.
During the first several years of the analysis public sector employees had in-
deed very low wages.4 Despite the fact that the share of university graduates 
is much larger in the public sector than in corporations, average wages are 
about 11 per cent lower in this sector before 2002. Figure 2.2.1 shows that 
public and corporate wages had experienced widely different growth patterns.
Figure 2.2.1: Wage growth in the public and corporate sectors  
(1998 = 100, N = 1,184,604)
While corporate real wages steadily increased by 3–6 per cent each year (ex-
cept in 2004 when they did not change), wages in the public sector follow a 
distinctly different pattern. In the first three years of the analysis the overall 
growth rate is quite similar in the two sectors, but between 2001 and 2002 
– the year when civil servants experienced a wage growth – public sector wag-
es grew by 15 per cent. This is followed by an increase of 22 per cent in 2002, 
which is more than a 5 times larger wage growth than in corporations.5 Our 
data therefore show that over a two-year time period, real wages in the pub-
lic sector increased by 40 per cent while those in corporations by only 12 per 
cent. In the last years of the analysis the overall growth rates are quite simi-
lar (but the timing varies). During the whole period studied, therefore, cor-
4 The wage measure used in this 
chapter is the monthly wage 
paid in May, and it includes the 
base wage, overtime pay, regular 
payments other than the base 
wage (such as language and 
managerial allowances), and 
1/12th of the previous year’s ir-
regular payments (e.g., end-of-
year bonuses and the 13th salary 
in the public sector).
5 The policy was labeled as a 
50 per cent increase, but it was 
not applied to civil servants and 
referred to the base nominal 
wages. We computed the growth 
of nominal base wages for public 
employees between 2002 and 
2003 which is indeed very close 
to 50 per cent.
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porate wages increased by 38 per cent while public sector wages increased by 
72 per cent – the large difference between the two growth rates was built up 
in only two years.
Identification strategy, results
The starting point in the measurement of the degree of interrelatedness of 
public and corporate wages is the classification of corporate workers by their 
“closeness” to the public sector: how similar they are to public employees. This 
is important to identify those workers who are likely to be affected by the 
wage increase. If, for example, a corporate worker has an occupation which 
does not exist in the public sector and his or her abilities are also very differ-
ent from what is demanded, a switch to the public sector is almost impossible 
due to a lack of demand or is very costly for the worker as most of his human 
capital will be lost. Therefore, the employer of such workers does not need to 
take into account their earnings potential in the public sector, which can be 
seen as an outside option in wage bargaining.
The variable measuring public sector proximity of a corporate employee is 
the proportion of public sector workers in labor market segments defined by 
gender, occupation and work experience. More precisely, I segment the labor 
market by gender, potential labor market experience (5-year intervals making 
up 8 groups) and 7 occupational dummies (manager, professional, associate 
professional, clerk, service worker, skilled worker and elementary occupation). 
I call this variable PSHARE.6
I regress the log of corporate sector wages on PSHARE, which is interacted 
with two periods of time which represent the periods before and after the 
public wage increase (1998–2001 and 2002–2006, respectively). To control 
for average wages by worker type, I include fixed effects of the variables used 
in the construction of PSHARE (Zijt) as well as year effects, 21 regional (coun-
ty) effects and a full set of 2-digit industries to partial out any differences 
between local labor markets, consumer prices, and industrial wage differen-
tials. As the level of public sector wages may also affect the strength of the 
spillover, I also control for the average public sector wage within labor market 
cells (WPijt). The unemployment rate (UEijt) at the cell level is included as well, 
as it can also affect spillovers: if there are many unemployed, the bargaining 
power of workers declines and they cannot ask for higher wages, regardless 
of the proximity of the public sector (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990).7 The 
estimation equation is the following (i indexes workers, j the labor market 
segment and t indexes time):
log(wijt)= α0 + γbefore PSHAREjt BEFOREt + γafter PSHAREjt AFTERt +
+ αwplog(WPjt) + αuelog(UEjt) + αxZijt + ΣαindINDUSTRYk +
+ ΣαregREGIONr + ΣαtYEARt +εijt
6 The average value of PSHARE 
is between 22 and 27 per cent 
during the period studied, its 
median is 13–14 per cent. The 
standard deviation of the vari-
able is large relative to the mean 
showing that the variable covers 
most of the interval on which it 
is defined.
7 The unemployment rate is 
computed for each labor mar-
ket segment defined by gender, 
experience and education, us-
ing the Hungarian Labor Force 
Survey.
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The estimated spillover effect is the difference between γafter and γbefore: this 
measures the change in the effect of the presence of the public sector on cor-
porate wages.
The results suggest that private wages do not vary by the exposure of work-
ers to the public sector before the public sector wage increase as the coefficient 
on the interaction of PSHARE and the period before the wage increase is only 
0.001. In the period subsequent to the public sector wage increase, however, 
the level of corporate compensation increases in the sectors exposed to the 
public sector: the estimated coefficient of PSHARE after 2001 is equal to 0.143 
(and is highly significant in statistical terms). Taking the difference between 
the coefficients associated with PSHARE before and after the wage increase 
as a measure of the wage spillover, this analysis finds that during a period of 
a 40-per cent increase in the public wage, a 10-per cent difference in public 
sector exposure induced a larger wage growth of 1.4 percentage points. Com-
pared to the wage increase of about 12 per cent during this period, this result 
translates to a faster wage growth of over 10 per cent, which is quite sizable.
To gauge how the spillover effect evolves in time, we present the same regres-
sions as before, but with a full set of interactions between years and PSHARE. 
These results are shown in Table 2.2.2. In the first three years of the analysis 
the coefficients of PSHARE are between –0.027 and –0.017 with no conceiv-
able trend. In 2001, in the year of the civil servant wage increase, the effect of 
public sector exposure on corporate wages is 3.3 per cent and one year later it 
grows to 7.1 per cent (both coefficients are statistically significant). In 2003, 
after the large public employee wage increase affecting almost all public sector 
workers, the coefficient becomes 0.176 further increasing to 0.2 the following 
year. The difference between the coefficient in 2001 and 2004 is 0.167 which 
we take as the estimate of the wage spillover. As the public wage premium 
starts to stagnate, the coefficients decrease somewhat.8
Table 2.2.2: The yearly effect of public sector size on corporate wages
pshare × 1998 –0.027 (0.018) pshare × 2003 0.176*** (0.014)
pshare × 1999 0.017 (0.017) pshare × 2004 0.200*** (0.014)
pshare × 2000 –0.019 (0.017) pshare × 2005 0.158*** (0.015)
pshare × 2001 0.033** (0.015) pshare × 2006 0.112*** (0.017)
pshare × 2002 0.071*** (0.013)
R2 0.445
N 1,184,604
Notes: Each regression includes controls for gender, experience, education, year, in-
dustry, and region. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1-per cent level; ** significant at the 5-per cent level.
Wage spillovers may also vary along the occupational structure of the corpo-
rate sector. Workers with occupations which are abundant in the public sec-
tor are likely to have a higher wage increase, as they can find a job more easily 
8 The last year of the analysis 
was election year which resulted 
in an increase of public sector 
wages. As the budget deficit was 
10 per cent of the GDP, it was 
expected that the new govern-
ment would cut back spending. 
As such interventions make the 
public sector less attractive to 
employees, this may be the 
reason for a declining spillo-
ver effect.
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and will not lose their occupation-specific human capital if they move (e.g., 
Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009). To test this, I construct a dummy vari-
able which categorizes each 3-digit occupation by its public sector share: the 
dummy equals 1 if this is larger than 40 per cent.9 This variable enters the 
estimation equation in a three-way interaction between the time periods be-
fore-after the wage increase and PSHARE (and I also control for its level). The 
estimated coefficients, presented in Table 2.2.3, indeed demonstrate that the 
spillover effect is larger for such workers. The interactions term just described 
is associated with a coefficient of –0.18 before the wage increase which shrinks 
to –0.115 in the period subsequent to it. Therefore the wages of such workers 
increase faster if the worker is exposed to the public sector.
Table 2.2.3: The effect of occupation on wage spillovers
pshare – Before 0.057*** (0.013) pshare – occprev – Before –0.179*** (0.016)
pshare – afTer 0.173*** (0.012) pshare – occprev – afTer –0.115** (0.017)
R2 0.446
N 1,184,604
Notes: Before = 1998–2001, After = 2002–2006. Occprev = 1 if occupation prevalent 
in public sector. Each regression includes controls for gender, experience, occupa-
tion, year, industry, region, and the Occprev interacted with “Before” and “After.” 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1-per cent level; ** significant at the 5-per cent level.
Another feature of the labor market which may alter wage spillovers is the 
proportion of new hires in the public sector. If there are no employment op-
portunities, corporate workers cannot switch sector. We compute the rate of 
new hires in the public sector relative to the number of workers in corpora-
tions within each labor market segment, and we add this variable to the regres-
sion.10 The results (presented in Table 2.2.4) show that public sector hiring 
does not have an effect on corporate wages before the wage increase (the esti-
mated coefficient is essentially zero), but after the public sector wage increase 
this coefficient becomes 0.12. Although the coefficient is not significant, its 
large magnitude provides partial evidence that more public vacancies induce 
a significantly faster wage increase in the corporate sector.
Table 2.2.4: The effect of public sector vacancies on wage spillovers
pshare – Before 0.017 (0.017) proporTion hired – Before –0.007 (0.125)
pshare – afTer 0.152** (0.014) proporTion hired – afTer 0.120 (0.078)
R2 0.444
N 951,303
Notes: Before = 1998 to 2001; After = 2002 to 2006. Each regression includes con-
trols for gender, experience, occupation, year, industry, region, and proportion 
hired. Proportion hired is measured relative to the size of the corporate sector. Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1-per cent level; ** significant at the 5-per cent level.
9 Out of 136 occupations, there 
are 42 which satisfy this condi-
tion, and they cover 10 per cent 
of corporate workers.
10 This variable is not interacted 
with PSHARE because it is pro-
portional to it by construction. 
The average public sector hiring 
rate (standard deviation) rela-
tive to private sector employ-
ment is 0.024 (0.065).
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Conclusions
This chapter analysed public wage spillovers, using for identification a fast and 
large wage rise which increased public sector wages by 40 per cent over a two 
year time period while corporate wages increased by only 12 per cent. Meas-
uring public sector proximity by the share of public workers in labor market 
cells defined by gender, labor market experience and occupation, it finds that 
a 10 per cent higher share of public sector employment in the labor market 
cell caused a faster corporate wage increase by about 10 per cent.
The above analysis therefore suggests that public wages do have an effect on 
the wage policies of corporations: not only may average wages increase induc-
ing therefore larger personnel costs, but wage differentials may also change 
as those workers, who are typical in the public sector, will be affected by 
spillovers to a larger extent than those who are not. It is also likely that such 
spillovers not only existed in Hungary in the early 2000s, but they occurred 
everywhere. This study used the periods before and after the public sector 
wage increase only to have a credible identification strategy – in the lack of 
an exogenous movement of public wages it is difficult to obtain an unbiased 
estimate of wage spillovers.
Using the results of the chapter, we can drive insights about the public sec-
tor wage spillovers in contemporary Hungary. Looking at the evolution of 
wages over the last decade or so, it is likely that their effect on corporate wages 
declined. As the information of the Hungarian Statistical Office suggests, be-
tween 2006 and 2013 public sector wages declined both in real and nominal 
terms and also relative to corporate wages. While the unconditional relative 
wage between the two sectors was 14–16 per cent in 2007 and 2008 (show-
ing that public sector workers obtained a premium on average), during the 
following four years this was continuously falling resulting in a public wage 
penalty of 15 per cent in 2012 (despite the fact that the proportion of highly 
skilled workers is much larger in the public sector than in corporations). The 
current policy which increased the wages of several occupations in the pub-
lic sector is not shown yet in the data, but it is likely that in the absence of a 
large wage increase, public sector wages will lag behind the compensation in 
corporations which decreases wage spillovers. This tendency, however, can be 
attenuated by longer job search in the corporate sector and less job security, 
which can make public sector jobs look more attractive to employees.
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